Problem/Question Addressed: We delineate two algorithms for the purchase of an AIDS vaccine depending upon whether a health sector perspective or societal perspective is employed. Projections based on these algorithms show how different policy objectives can lead to vast differences in the number of courses of vaccine needed in the future.
Introduction
In this paper we attempt to answer the question, "If an AIDS vaccine arrived in the world on 1 January 2000, what are the ramifications of two different decision algorithms, in terms of who would get the vaccine and how many would be needed?" Anticipating the answer to this question will aid policy makers as they prepare for the efficient and equitable use of an AIDS vaccine.
An effective AIDS vaccine does not yet exist. Forecasting what will happen when a vaccine
is developed is difficult. Unforeseen changes in the fundamental determinants of demand for a vaccine will occur between now and the time when a vaccine is released. These determinants not only include the epidemiology of AIDS/HIV, the world's demographic makeup, and the economic resources available for health, but also the properties of the vaccines themselves. Developments in vaccine production capacity and technology could change the determinants of supply. Because all of these unknown factors are interrelated, an attempt to simultaneously offer 10-year forecasts would lack credibility. Thus, rather than project what demand will be in the year 2010, we profile who the most likely vaccine recipients would be in the year 2000 according to 2 different algorithms. We enumerate likely vaccine recipients under each algorithm as a function of possible vaccine price regimes.
METHODS

Health Sector versus Societal Perspective
To select algorithms for AIDS vaccine allocation that are relevant to what might actually occur, we employ what is known from empirical studies of national decisions to purchase other vaccines. It has been shown from studies of the uptake of Hepatitis B and Hemophilus Influenza B vaccines that a country's adoption of a vaccine depends on the cost of the vaccine, the incidence of the disease, the GDP/capita, and the cost of the consequences of the disease (Brooks et al. 1999; Miller and Flanders 1999) . There are two possible perspectives on the costs of an illness: 1) The health sector perspective in which the cost of an illness is the net present value of the sum of the costs of the medical care required by the victims; and 2) The societal perspective in which the cost of an illness is not only the medical costs but the lost productivity of workers and families affected by the disease (Gold et al. 1996) . Neither of these perspectives ordinarily includes the immense intangible costs of pain, suffering, and bereavement that are borne by individuals. The decision that countries will eventually have to make regarding the purchase of the AIDS vaccine could be motivated by either of these two perspectives on the cost of disease. The model that currently appears to be most prevalent for vaccine purchase decisions by health ministries is the health sector perspective. The government health ministry is allocated a fixed budget and asked to allocate purchases for all items (including vaccines) to maximize a population's health under that budget.
Health ministries may consider other objectives besides maximizing population health. Phoolcharoen et al (1999) consider a case where the health ministry saw its primary role as allocating vaccine to minimize the contagion externality regardless of the impact of AIDS on its own operating budget. Although such policies may be adopted in the future and may prove to be valid disease control strategies, there are few historical occurrences of vaccine policies selectively targeting those most likely to be contagious among a vast pool of susceptibles. Our algorithms whose principal objective is limiting the budgetary impact of AIDS will account for the budgetary ramifications of special populations with a high propensity to spread disease. This does lead to different priorities from policies which make the minimization of secondary spread the principal objective.
AIDS Vaccine Characteristics
We base our assumptions about the characteristics of an AIDS vaccine on known properties of current vaccines. Vaccination efficacy will be sequentially modeled at 60%, 75%, and 90% efficacy with a duration of exactly 10 years. For example a recipient of a vaccine with 75% efficacy experiences an immediate 75% reduction in the risk of contracting AIDS over the next decade.
Lacking any basis to predict how risk behavior may change as a result of vaccination we assume it will be constant. With vaccines of low efficacy, vaccine induced increases in risky behavior could have serious repercussions for policy (Anderson and Garnett 1996) . Were we to apply our algorithms to vaccines of lower efficacy they would certainly require adaptation to account for behavioral effects of vaccine. There is an urgent need for empirical data on the behavioral responses of participants in vaccine trials.
Eventual responders cannot be distinguished from non-responders ex ante. We assume adverse effects of the vaccine are temporary and self-limited. We assume transportation and administration costs are no different for the AIDS vaccine than for current vaccines. We assume that the vaccine's protection will last at least 10 years. We do not consider here any applications of the vaccine to reduce viral shedding or viral load in those already infected. We assume that administering the vaccine to a susceptible pregnant woman protects the woman and is safe for the fetus. Infants born to pregnant vaccine recipients are susceptible until they themselves are vaccinated.
We profile potential vaccine recipients by first dividing the world's population geographically into the major geographical regions established by the UN. We arbitrarily classify as "less developed countries" (LDCs): North Africa/Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, South/South-East Asia, Eastern Europe/Central Asia, East Asia/Pacific, Caribbean, and Latin America. We arbitrarily classify as "more developed countries" (MDCs): Western Europe, North America, and Australia/New Zealand.
There are obvious grounds for many specific exceptions. The one exception we did allow was to consider Japan, Korea, and China separately from the East Asian Region to narrow the otherwise wide variation in HIV economics and risk in this region.
Within each region we disaggregate the general population into 4 groups on the basis of age and sex. In Table 1 we propose a possible further breakdown of the groups most likely to be considered individually for vaccine receipt due to their high risk. Table 1 indicates there is little comprehensive data upon which to base population estimates for high risk groups such as commercial sex workers (CSWs), injection drug users (IDUs), and men who have sex with men (MSM) in each region of the world. The likelihood that these populations would be targeted by public health campaigns could influence the allocation of an AIDS vaccine. Here we analyze models that incorporate estimates of the numbers of commercial sex workers, IDUs, and MSM, but we note that the small size of these groups relative to the general population make estimates of the total need for vaccine relatively robust to their inclusion or exclusion in the model. In this paper we present the details relevant to the general populations and selected high-risk populations.
Decision Rule Algorithm
We developed the following simple algorithm to profile the regional subgroups as vaccine recipients or non-recipients based on the "marginal benefit" (MB) of allocating AIDS vaccines to that group. Group j is a "vaccine recipient" if MBj>P; otherwise it is a non-vaccine recipient.
[Rule 1]
Where P is total price of a complete course of vaccine (including administration costs) and MBj is marginal benefit of extending vaccination to include group j. MBj is given as follows:
Where: E = vaccine efficacy from 0-100%, assumed=75% for exactly 10 years in baseline analysis. Ij10 = decadal incidence of HIV expressed as the discounted likelihood that the average person in group j will seroconvert in the next 10 years. Nj = the number of secondary cases that infected individuals in this group cause over 10 years PV = denotes present value computed at a 3% discount rate HCj = health care costs between the onset of HIV/AIDS and death VCj = vaccine administration cost
We call Equation 1 the "health sector perspective" because it might reflect the perspective of a minister of health searching for investments which minimize the drain that a given disease poses to an arbitrarily fixed health sector budget. We also compute MBj from a societal perspective alternative that includes lost productivity.
Where: Wj = lost lifetime wage after the onset of total disability from AIDS. To implement the algorithm we gathered secondary data for each regional subgroup on HIV incidence (Bernard et al. 1998; UNAIDS and WHO 1998a) , medical care costs (Mann, Tarantola and Netter 1992) , and GDP/Capita (World Bank 1998). Sensitivity analysis of models incorporating highrisk groups demonstrated that estimates of the number of secondary cases spread by CSWs and
IDUs was unnecessary-according to the algorithm their own high risk rendered them vaccine recipients whether or not they infected any secondary cases. We assume that for the general population that the number of secondary cases caused is negligible and make the approximation that Nj ≈0
After using the algorithms to profile each subgroup as a "recipient" or "non-recipient", as a function of the vaccine price, we tabulated the cumulative population of recipients across all subgroups, based on demographic data for cohorts defined by age and sex. (United Nations 1997)
Medical Care Costs
We assume that in the developed world, a patient would begin to incur medical costs on average about 2 years after seroconverting and incur them for 10 years before succumbing to disease (Curran et al. 1988 ). In the developed countries significant medical costs are incurred through the use of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) for asymptomatic seropositive patients. The two-year duration reflects delays in seroconversion and delays in diagnosis of seroconverions. Prior to the development of HAART and improvements in opportunistic disease prophylaxis, the time between seroconversion and death was thought to be 10 years (Bartlett 1998 ). Responders to HAART may have dramatically prolonged survival, but it is too soon to tell. Indeed the very best answer to the question, "How long between seroconversion and death in the developed world in 1999?" is "Nobody knows." It is likely that HAART will increase the total medical costs per case of AIDS, so we treat this possibility in our sensitivity analysis.
We assume that in developing countries, an adult patient would begin to incur medical costs 5 years after seroconverting and incur them for an average of 2 years (Morgan et al. 1997 ). The natural history of HIV/AIDS in children regarding mean time to AIDS and mean time to death does not appear to deviate markedly from adults (Barnhart et al. 1996) . Our model neglects possible regional differences in care seeking behavior and opportunistic infections that might lead adult groups to spend more on treatments than children. Little is known about these differentials. Thus medical costs are assumed to be the same for all ages and sexes. We discount the medical costs and lost wage costs by 3%. Estimates of the actual medical care costs of AIDS in each region are derived as shown in the appendix.
Productivity Costs
We assume that adults who seroconvert would withdraw from the labor force after six years in developed countries, and after four years in developing countries. In withdrawing from the labor force these patients would cease to add valuable goods and services to the economy. We assume that in every country for adults age 15-49 that the average age for the onset of AIDS is 30 and that retirement age is 65. AIDS thus yields 35 years of productivity loss. We compute the present value of this loss using a discount rate of 3%. As a measure of the value of these lost goods and services, we use the regional GDP/Capita and apply it to both men and women. GDP/capita is a coarse measure of economic well being; however, there are few alternative measures. The global perspective of this paper makes it infeasible to account for the complex adaptation any individual economy may make to the loss of many productive workers (Over et al. 192) . Furthermore, the morbidity and mortality of AIDS impose an intangible burden of pain and suffering that the GDP cannot possibly reflect.
Vaccine Administration Costs
A full consideration of the delivery costs would include the costs of marketing the vaccine to individual target groups (Cutts, Orenstein and Bernier 1992; Kim-Farley and EPI Team 1992) .
However, we suspect that in many parts of the world, the word about the vaccine will spread quickly--along with misinformation about its safety and efficacy. Much of the marketing costs will depend on what sorts of local rumors are spread about the vaccine and how deeply they are entrenched (Nichter 1995) . Lacking a basis to estimate marketing costs we focus on administration costs. In developed countries, we take as an estimate the physician fee ($4.21) for therapeutic injection in the U.S. (CPT 90782) (Health Care Financing Administration 1998). In less developed countries, the administration cost of adding an additional vaccine to the EPI program has been estimated at $0.50 (Hall et al. 1993) . Table 2 presents present value estimates of the lifetime cost of a single case of AIDS in each region of the world for children, teens, adult men, and adult women. The costs are presented for both the societal and the health sector perspective. These estimated medical costs range from a low of $38 per case of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa to a high of nearly $300,000 per case in North
Results
America. The large variation in costs is due to both variation in the availability of costly treatments and variation in survival.
The societal costs are lower for infants than for children because the eventual lost lifetime productivity is discounted by more years. The societal costs are higher for children than adults because more years of productivity are lost on average for a child or teenager who is infected.
The Benefit of AIDS Vaccines
Given our estimates of HIV seroconversion risk, vaccine efficacy, and the economic loss, we can compute MB for each target group using Equation 1 for the health sector perspective, and Equation 2 for the societal perspective. These results are displayed in Tables 3 and 4 .
Reviewing the health sector perspective, the groups with negative benefits (Table 3 ) are generally at a very low immediate risk of HIV, and primarily are infants of low risk mothers or those people residing in countries where the lack of treatments for HIV/AIDS makes the medical cost of the disease artificially low. Comparing the actual estimates of vaccination benefits to the benefits developing countries would gain if their medical spending were that of Western Europe indicates that as more medical treatments begin to be provided to HIV/AIDS patients the value of an AIDS vaccine in developing countries will only increase. Table 4 shows the net present benefits of vaccination from the societal perspective. The table shows that if the goal is to maximize the GDP, there are few population groups anywhere in the world with an HIV risk so low that vaccine administration costs exceed the benefits. A person in a high-risk region like sub-Saharan Africa faces a greater than 10% chance of annihilation from HIV/AIDS. Thus, it is not surprising that the benefit of removing this threat is a large fraction of the remaining lifetime incomes shown in Table 2 . The values in Tables 3 and 4 The parenthesized values in Tables 3 and 4 indicate the benefit that a Western European would derive from the AIDS vaccine if they faced the same risk as corresponding groups in other areas of the world. This exercise offers a lens with which to view the economics of the AIDS epidemic from a standardized perspective. The relatively low risk of a Western European man makes reducing that HIV/AIDS risk a $789 nuisance, but if that same man were to confront the HIV/AIDS risk of an African then this threat would be a $48,577 crisis.
Vaccine Demand Curves
Each different algorithms is designed to label the various subpopulations of the world as "vaccine recipients" or "non-recipients" as the price of vaccine varies from $200 to $1.00 per course.
The graphs enumerate the number of vaccine recipients as a function of the price of vaccine. Figure 1 does this according to the health sector decision algorithm. Figure 2 shows the "demand curve" that would be generated from the societal perspective algorithm. We use the term "demand curve" to suggest isomorphism to the typical price vs. quantity graphs from economics. We do not mean to suggest that the quantity demanded on the horizontal axis will result from the aggregate decisions of individual households in a private market. However, country level decision-makers are very likely to make purchase decisions as a function of price. Country level heterogeneity in HIV risk and national resources will lead countries of low financial resources and/or low risk to defer vaccine adoption until the price becomes quite low. These curves ignore the constraints that poor populations will face in obtaining sufficient financing to purchase a quantity of vaccine that achieves an optimal allocation according to the algorithm. Estimates of these financing shortfalls are discussed below.
The callout boxes in Figures 1 and 2 identify some of the main sub-populations that make the transition from non-recipients to recipients as the price goes down. The callout boxes are far from comprehensive as there are over 91 separate subpopulations being tracked (13 regions x 7 risk groups). The general pattern depicted by the callout boxes is that at high prices the vaccine recipients have very high risk or very high medical and productivity costs of AIDS. As the price drops below $25 (Health Sector Algorithm) and below $50 (Societal Algorithm) very large populations from less developed countries convert to vaccine recipients and account for highly elastic price response at the lower price ranges.
Sensitivity Tests
To test the robustness of our model to our estimates of incidence we re-estimated the demand curves with the assumption that incidence was 25% lower and 25% higher for each population. These alternative demand curves are displayed as dotted lines in the figures. Testing sensitivity to the cost assumptions by altering assumed medical and productivity costs by ± 25%
generates identical results to those plotted as dotted lines in Figures 1 and 2 , due to the structure of the equations.
Assumptions about vaccine efficacy also affect the number of vaccines distributed by the algorithm. The dotted lines in Figures 3 and 4 plot out how much more or less vaccine is distributed if the vaccine lowers risk by 90% or 60%.
Discussion
Limitations
On a population basis, it is reasonable to conduct policy analysis using the notion of population risk. Caution is warranted however, however, because the risk of HIV/AIDS is not the same for every individual in a group. The possibility of safer lifestyles makes a vaccine an optional but not unique way to prevent HIV/AIDS. If one were to survey individuals on how much they would pay for an AIDS vaccine, responses would likely diverge from our values based on differences between an individual's own perceived HIV risk and the population risk measures our model would impute to him. Some individuals who are able to choose an absolutely risk free lifestyle may choose to never obtain an AIDS vaccine. For now, our model makes the arbitrary assumption that all individuals above age 49 are categorically able to eliminate their HIV risk through safe lifestyles. This achieves simplicity at the expense of disregarding the evidence that risk free lifestyles exist for individuals in younger cohorts and that HIV continues to be transmitted between individuals well beyond age 49.
Policy Analysis for a $10 Vaccine
Until an AIDS vaccine is discovered, the marginal cost of producing it is unknown. The claim by industry (Dupuy and Freidel 1990 ) that there are increasing returns to scale in the production of vaccine suggests that in the first few years of vaccine production, the cost could be significantly higher than for subsequent generations of vaccine users. Unless firms are given incentives to rapidly extend capacity, it could be an additional decade after the first vaccine before one could expect an AIDS vaccine whose marginal production cost for a course is less than $1.00.
Perhaps after this decade, additional factories will have been built throughout the world to reap returns to scale.
Suppose the marginal cost just to produce and deliver a single course of the first generation of vaccine is $10.00. The health sector allocation strategy suggests that 766 million people would obtain benefits in excess of $10.00 and hence would wish to buy the vaccine. The model predicts that of these roughly 235 million are estimated to be in LDCs. In contrast, the societal allocation strategy suggests that 3.7 billion persons (3.3 billion in LDCs) would obtain benefits in excess of $10.00. The equity model predicts that if everybody in the world had the resources of Western Europe, virtually everybody in the world under the age of 49 (4.7 billion out of 4.8 billion) would bear sufficient HIV risk to justify a $10.00 investment in AIDS vaccine.
Which Vaccine Allocation Curve?
Health ministries in regions like Africa would still be reluctant to purchase vaccine at a $10 price because $10.00 per person would exhaust all of the average annual health ministry budget. Our model predicts that it would require a $9.00 purchase subsidy to make the most optimal vaccine purchase affordable for health ministries in sub-Saharan Africa. With a $9.00 subsidy, a typical sub-Saharan health ministry could expect to recoup its own $1.00 outlay in the form of reduced medical expenditure for HIV/AIDS.
In contrast to health ministries, our model predicts that treasury departments in every region of the world ought to be willing to spend $10.00 per citizen on AIDS vaccination for large portions of the teenage and adult populations. Such investment decisions would pay their way through enhanced survival of working populations. Indeed, there is a growing recognition that confronting AIDS is not just a health issue, but a development issue (World Bank 1997).
An important caveat is that both the health sector perspective and the societal perspective would allocate vaccine based on ability to pay just like any other commodity. Rationing by ability to pay, based on the societal perspective model would still deny AIDS vaccine to roughly 700 million LDC infants who would have obtained earlier protection had they been born in wealthier countries.
Unless world leaders agree to policies supporting public and private cooperation to correct inequity, the AIDS vaccine is likely to be allocated as unequally as any other scarce commodity.
Is There Enough AIDS Vaccine Research & Development?
The AIDS vaccine allocation that we project is compatible with substantial profitability depending on the marginal cost of the vaccine. Profits in the pharmaceutical industry are difficult to predict because regulators retain tight control over firms' abilities to use the monopoly privileges they have earned through research. Although potential demand is important in projecting profit, potential regulations are equally important. It is unlikely that any pharmaceutical company could afford to behave like an unfettered monopolist in setting profit margins for the AIDS vaccine, but unless the vaccine production costs are exorbitant, a markup of $1.00 per course of vaccine would generate between $1-4 billion in profit. One route to higher profits is the ability to charge wealthier countries more than poorer countries for pharmaceuticals. Regulatory changes discussed by the EEC (Danzon 1997) , and statements by US Congressmen (Russell 1997) threaten to erode this option. The recent experience of South Africa indicates that when poorer countries can obtain life-saving AIDS drugs at lower prices, the temptation to re-import them proves irresistible to politicians. Credible signals that international regulatory institutions were prepared to tolerate and enforce higher profit margins for a pharmaceutical firm with a patent on the AIDS vaccine would substantially inflate the estimates of future profitability and stimulate private investment in AIDS vaccine research.
.
Conclusion
This paper has offered depictions of two models of AIDS vaccine allocation based on ability to pay and one alternative model of allocation based on equity. The ability to pay model was based on predictors of vaccine uptake such as incidence, medical spending, and GDP/capita that were proven empirically to have been associated with regional uptake of Hepatitis B vaccine and Hemophilus Influenza B vaccine (Miller and Flanders 1999 ). The equity model was based on what demand would be if populations with higher the HIV/AIDS risk had the financial resources of Western Europeans.
The model reveals that large disparities in the attention given to HIV/AIDS could be based on global resource inequalities. The relatively low risk of a Western European man makes reducing this HIV/AIDS risk a $789 concern, but if that same man were transplanted to sub-Saharan Africa HIV/AIDS would be a $48,577 crisis.
Our finding that financing the AIDS vaccine solely within the fixed budget of a ministry of health could exclude large and vulnerable populations from vaccine receipt offers a strong reminder that HIV/AIDS must be considered a development issue affecting an entire economy.
Nevertheless we find that allocation of AIDS vaccine based on societal ability to pay would still exclude large numbers of poor infants who would be immunized if they were born in more developed regions. Policymakers concerned with equity in health need to redouble efforts to make financing the human confrontation with AIDS a global, rather than a regional, issue. (Phoolcharoen et al. 1999) [1] Discounting at 3% . Note that this places less weight on the productivity losses of children who acquire AIDS. [2] "Societal" refers to the sum of medical and productivity losses Table 4 . Dotted lines show sensitivity of demand estimates to variation in HIV incidence rates.
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Appendix A: Estimating AIDS Incidence over 10 Years by Population Subgroup
We base our incidence rates on UNAIDS estimates for regional populations of the world (Bernard et al. 1998; UNAIDS and WHO 1998b) . It is important to point out that the most common identifiable risk factor for HIV/AIDS in most parts of the world is being a heterosexual adult who has had sex with multiple partners or with a partner with multiple partners. In those few areas where the bulk of incident HIV cases have some other identifiable risk factor, attributing UNAIDS incidence estimates to the general population results in an overestimate of risk. Sensitivity analyses show that demand at higher vaccine prices is more sensitive than at prices under $10.00. As improved HIV incidence data are assembled our model will be updated.
Using UNAIDS estimates of incidence rates for adults in the major regions of the world, (Bernard et al. 1998; UNAIDS and WHO 1998b) we make the assumption that the gender ratio of prevalent cases is a good approximation of the gender ratio of incident cases. This assumption is an oversimplification of the complex dynamics of the AIDS epidemic, but it permits us to leverage what we know about prevalence among target groups at the regional level to offer a rough suggestion of annual attack rates in the adult target groups.
Sensitivity analyses discussed in the text reveal how important these assumptions are in determining the results of the model.
We assume that annual attack rate in the cohort of age 5-14 is 50% of adult incidence because over the subsequent decade, half of the life years of this cohort will be spent in the age group 15-24.
We assume that incidence for a cohort age 0-4 is exclusively due to mother-child transmission. We use as the probability that the child of a seropositive mother will experience HIV seroconversion prior to age 10 the estimate of 42.8% and the probability that the infection occurred post-natally of 44% (Datta et al. 1994 ). When we estimate decadal incidence in this group as 42.8% × 44%× HIV Prevalence in Women Age 15-49, we are assuming that births are as frequent for HIV+ as HIV-women although this may not be the case (Gray et al. 1998 ). Our sensitivity tests cover incidence rates in this cohort that are as much as 25% lower to cover this possibility.
To convert annual attack rates, Ajt, to decadal incidence, Ij10 we use the formula: where r is the discount rate. We adopt the approximation that 1-Ijt-1 ≅1. Discounting is necessary because seroconversion t years into the ten year period postpones the costs by t additional years.
Appendix Table A1 shows the source data on attack rates and our estimates of the discounted decadal incidence rates for each group. Estimates of incidence in CSWs, IDUs and MSM are more problematic. Clearly the incidence rates in these populations have been higher than those of the general adult population as reflected in their higher prevalence rates. Assuming that incidence rates and case fatality rates in both the high risk groups and general
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Appendix C. Number of People in Each Regional Group
In Appendix Table C . Displayed are the numbers of people in each region of the world according to the major age and sex groups considered in the model. Data are from WHO 1998a) and United Nations, 1997 (United Nations 1997). Data on the numbers of CSWs, IDUs, and MSM in the world are quite limited. Based on the sources listed in Table 1 , we make the following assumptions: CSWs make up 0.7% of adult women (age 15-49) in every region of the world, IDUs make up 0.10% of adult men (age 15-49) in every region of the world, and MSM make up 3% of adult men (age 15-49) in every region of the world. Because it is doubtful that MSM and IDUs will be effectively targeted in many regions of the less developed world we simply set the effective population estimate for these groups to zero in the regions noted by "NA" in Appendix Table A2 .
Sensitivity analyses indicate that because these high risk groups make up a relatively small proportion of the population facing a risk of HIV/AIDS that the amount of vaccine required is not changed significantly even if we set the size of these populations to zero. However regional policy makers will need to form better estimates of these population's sizes because their high risk makes allocating vaccine to them a priority even at high vaccine prices.
